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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DALE BERKELEY WILSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 7969

VS.

DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

Dale Berkeley Wilson, plaintiff, filed suit against the
defendant, Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd, asking damages for alienation of Wilson's wife's affections in the sum ·of $75,000.00
compensatory damages and $25;000 punitive damages. Dr.
Oldroyd filed a counter-claim for slander asking damages in
the amount of $110,000.00 plus $719.00 for medical services
allegedly rendered .by Dr. Oldroyd to the plaintiff and his
family. After an extended trial, the jury ~eturned the verdict
awarding damages to Wilson in the amount of $50,000.00
compensatory damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages. They
3
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returned a verdict of no cause of action on Dr. Oldroyd's
counter-claim for slander, but awarded the full amount claimed,
$719.00, on the counterclai~ for medical services rendered. A
motion for a new trial was filed by the defendant and denied
by the trial court. This appeal is taken from the verdict of
the jury on the alienation of affection case.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd is a physician and surgeon residing
at Payson, Utah where he has been practicing his profession
since July 1, 1934. Dr. Oldroyd is married and was then and
now is residing with his wife and two minor sons in Payson.
The plaintiff, Dale Wilson, and his wife, Geraldine Wilson were married June 4, 1939 at Reno, Nevada. After living
for a period in Salt Lake City, Utah and San Francisco, California, they moved to Payson, Utah in the spring of 1940.
Mrs. Wilson was a nurse by profession. She worked for many
years at the Payson Hospital where Dr. Oldroyd was a member
of the staff. The evidence as to the relationship between Dr.
Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson comes almost· entirely from testimony given by Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson and from a letter
introduced in evidence which was mailed by Dr. Oldroyd to
Mrs. Wilson and removed from the United States mails by
the plaintiff, Dale Wilson. It is evident from the testimony
of Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson and from this letter that
an infatuation developed between Dr. Oldroyq and Mrs.
Wilson. Dr. Oldroyd testified that he kissed Mrs. Wilson
and told her that he loved her on the evening of December
4
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6, 1950 when, at her request, he drove her home from work
at the hospital. Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs .. Wilson also testified
that they had kissed each other on a nun1ber of occasions after
that and that they had expressed to each other on a number of
other occasions at a later date sentiments of mutual love and
affection. There is np evid~.Qce in the r~cord or even an inti. f
h k!tJ 1/?__itf.( .
.
.
.
matton rom t e ;aeteftua:nt that there was at any time any
immoral conduct ·b~tween Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson ..
On or about the 20th day of January 1951, Mrs~ Wilson
left her husband and went to Riverside, Cali.fornia to the
home of her father, who was a practicing physician. Immediately after Mrs. Wilson left, Dr. Oldroyd wrote Mrs. Wilson
a rather affectionate letter which was secured by Dale Wilsol?from the United States mails. Dale Wilson then confronted
Dr. Oldroyd and Dr. Oldroyd's wife with the letter in question. The Doctor admitted an affection for Mrs. Wilson but
expressed his regret that the situation between the Wilsons
had come to the state where Mrs. Wilson was leaving her
husband. Wilson then asked Dr. Oldroyd if the doctor would
write a. letter to Mrs. Wilson urging her to return to· herhusband. The doctor wrote this letter and in response to
this urging and the urging from her father, Mrs. Wilson did
return to her husband at her home in Payson abo'ut the 28th
or 29th of January, 1951. Dr. Oldroyd then talked to both
of the Wilsons jointly urging them to patch up their differences
and to resume their relationship as husband and wife. Never
after that, except on one occasion on the 31st day of January
Wh~n Dale Wilson himself brought his wife to Dr. Oldroyd's
office, does the evidence indicate that Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs.
Wilson were ever alone in each other's company.
5
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The situation between the Wilsons, however, did not
improve in the succeeding month and on at laest two occasions
Mr. Wilson physically abused Mrs. Wilson, once by hitting
her with his hand and on another occasion by slamming an
oven door on her hand causing a rather painful injury. In
March of 1951, Mrs. Wilson again left and taking her two
children with her, went to the home of her father in Riverside,
California where she has continued to reside to this time.
In July of 1951 Mrs. Wilson filed suit for divorce against
her husband. Mr. Wilson counterclaimed asking for a divorce
on his own account. After a trial. in which all of the evidence
as to Mr. Wilson's abuse of his wife and evidence as to Mrs.
Wilson's relationship with Dr. Oldroyd was introduced, the
court awarded Mrs. Wilson the divorce, awarded her custody
of the children and alimony and support money in the amount
of $150.00 per month.
As to the facts related to this point, there is no conflict
in the evidence, either the parties are in agreement as to their
testimony or the testimony of one side or the other stands
uncontradicted. The principle dispute in the evidence in the
case is as to the nature of the relationship between Dale Wilson
and Geraldine Wilson prior to the time that any act occurred
on the part of Dr. Oldroyd which could possibly have had
any effect of alienating Mrs. Wilson's affections from her
husband.
Dale Wilson, on direct examination, testified generally
that during all of their married life he and his wife had lived
in connubial bliss, unmarred by any incident which would indicate that she did not have the greatest affection for him. He

6
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further testified that until the infatuation developed between
Dr. Oldroyd and his wife hat there was never any indication
on his wife's part that all of her love and affection did not
belong to him. He .further testified as to his great sorrow and
distress at losing his wife, and placed the full. blame on Dr.
Oldroyd for what had occurred.
On cross-examination, however, Dale Wilson admitted
that in November, a month before there is any evidence of
any association between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson, that
he was aware that his wife was attempting to attract Dr. Oldroyd's attention. He testified that Dr. Oldroyd would go by the
Wilson home at a certain time each day on his way to his farm
and that on such occasions Mrs. Wilson would dress up, put
a ribbon in her hair, and go out into the yard and wait for
the doctor to pass. He further testified that on one occasion,
sometime prior to December, he was suspicious of his wife's
interest in Dr. Oldroyd, when one day on the streets of Payson
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson had s~en Dr. Oldroyd dozing in his
automobile and Mrs. Wilson became rather concerned for
fear that he was ill. He further admitted on cross-examination
that early in the year of 1950, months before any association
had occurred between Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Oldroyd that he,
Wilson, had accused his wife of improper conduct with a Dr.
Steele, who is also at the Payson Hospital.
In regard to his injured feelings, he admitted on crossexamination that on or about the 25th day of January, after
he had removed the letter from the mails he had discussed
the letter with his cousin, Lee Nebeker, attorney at law, and .
had stated in effect that he didn't care about Geraldine leaving
7
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him, but that he would like to get $10,000 or $15,000 from
the doctor for his children and that such amount would not
hurt the doctor. He further admitted that by the time the
divorce action between himself and Mrs. Wilson came up
that his injured feelings were sufficiently healed that he was
keeping company, rather regularly, with a Miss Phyllis Armstrong.
Geraldine Wilson's testimony, on the other hand, is a
recital of numerous and continual offenses against her b~
husband which had completely ·destroyeq any love or affection
she might have had for him long before she had any more than
a passing acquaintance with Dr. Oldroyd. She· testified that
from the beginning of their married life, Dale Wilson was
cold and indifferent toward her and related numerous specific
instances where on social occasions he had completely ignored
her and allowed her to go home by herself or with other men
who were willing to see her safely home when her husband
refused to do so.
She told of her husband's irresponsibility in financial
matters, how he had ·never provided her with the comforts
of life, had compelled her to live in an old family home without
modern conveniences and how she herself had been forced to
·go to work in order to earn money to keep up the family. She
testified further that they had discussed the matter of getting
a divorce in 1943. In 1947, three years before there is any
evidence of any act of Dr. Oldroyd in regard to Mrs. Wilson,
she left her husband and went to the home of her father intending to secure a divorce, but was persuaded by her father
8
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to return to Mr. Wilson and attempt to establish a home for
the sake of her children.
She further testified that she went to ·California in 191,1
and 1959 for periods of time, principally for the purpose of
getting away from her husband. She told of the accusations
made against her by her husband in regard .to Dr. Steele which
have been referred to above. She was prevented by the Court
from testifying as to many things said and. done by her husband on the grounds that such testimony was incompetent
under the rule of privilege communications. These matters,
as well as other matters of evidence, will be more fully discussed later in the brief in connection with the Assignments
of Error to which such matters are relevant.
Mrs. Wilson testified that before she knew Dr. Oldroyd
more than casually all affection which .she had for her husband had been destroyed and that she disliked him so badly
that she ((couldn't stand the sight of him."
Dr. Oldroyd testified, which testimony was uncontradicted,
that in September of 1950, months before he had more than
a professional interest in Mrs. Wilson she had asked him to
allow her to accompany him on a trip to Zion's Canyon, but
had then declined to·go on being informed that Mrs. Oldroyd
was going on the trip. ·
On the theory that such evidence was competent .as going
to the question of punitive damages, the Judge allowed evidence to ·be introduced as to the financial wealth of Dr. Oldroyd. These matters and other matters of evidence will be.
more fully discussed later in the brief.
9
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A. MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT AND IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OVER
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SAID COMPLAINT
FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

POINT TWO
THE VERDICT IS SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO
APPEAR· TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THE COURT
ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON
SUCH GROUNDS.

POINT THREE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF ANY KIND· AGAINST THE DEFENDANT,
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN PL}dN-,.Y.
UFF'S FAVOR AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS
AGAINST THE EVIDEN~ ~ ~
't,c.cc.,.,• ~
10
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POINT FOUR
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICE, WILFULNESS OR WANTONNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO JUSTIFY -THE SUBMISSION OF THE
QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE. JURY.

POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE FINANCIAL
WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT.
\

POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED ON INSTRUCTING THE JURY
IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:

(a) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
IN INSTRUCTIONS
.
(

NUMBERED 4, 5, 6, and 7 THAT THEY SHOULD
FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THEY FOUND
THAT THE DEFENDANT PERSUADED THE
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE TO DESERT OR LEAVE THE
PLAINTIFF.

(b) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 6 THAT THE LAW PRESUMES THE
POSSIBILITY OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
MAN AND WIFE.
11
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(c). IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

POINT SEVEN
. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:

(a) IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF GERJ\LDINE
WILSON REGARDING EVENTS AND OCCUR'
RENCES DURING HER MARRIED LIFE WITH
THE PLAINTIFF, DALE WILSON.

•

(b) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO
CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IN THE
TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE ACTION AND AT THE
TAKING OF HER DEPOSITION.

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT AND IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OVER
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SAID COMPLAINT
FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
12
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It is our position that the complaint filed in this cause
fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cl~im against
defendant. The allegation of plaintiff's complaint are mere
legal conclusions. We believe that a special demurrer to the
complaint under our former pleading should have been sustained. We believe the motion for a more definite statement
and the motion to dismiss should have been sustained in this
case. We wish to call the court's attention to the fact that
an intermedaite appeal was taken by defendant upon the court's
ruling denying our motions.
We have searched in vain to find a reported case or a
suggested form in which a complaint for alienation of affection .
is pleaded as plaintiff. has pleaded in this case. All of the sugg~sted forms contain allegations of ultimate facts in additio~
to the legal conclusion ((alienated the affections of plaintiff's
wife.''
The suggested forms contain such allegations as the
following:
<(Wilfully and maliciously gained the affections of E.F., ·
and induced him to have carnal intercourse with her, and
sought to persuade him and entice him by offers of money and
othe~ise to leave plaintiff without. support and go with defendant."
''Did falsely speak and pu~lish and declare concerning
this plaintiff that she had been a lewd and unchaste woman,
prior to her said marriage. That by reason of the speaking and
publishing of said false and slanderous words by ·defendant,

13
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the plaintiff's said husband's affections for her were and are
alienated and destroyed."
In the case of Buckley v. Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P (2)
188, the complaint alleged ultimate acts to-wit: ctby means
of gifts, arts, blandishments and inducements and by continuously associating himself with her, etc."
The only allegation in plaintiff's complaint is nalienated
the affections of Geraldine Beck Wilson from the plaintiff."
That allegation is not an allegation of an ultimate fact.
It is only a bald conclusjon. It alleges the result and not the
facts from which the result follows.
The following are allegations of ultimate facts:
rr Caused numerous false statements to be made to plaintiff's wife as to her chastity which defendants claimed had been
uttered and published by plaintiff.'' Monson v. Solace, (Mont.)
212 P. 1103.

rrBy subtle contrivances, by coaxing, and threats of disinheriting the sadi Edward L. ·Williams, to entice him to separate himself from plaintiff and leave and desert her
"
Williams v. Williams, (Colo.) 37 P. 614.
Persistently urged, coaxed and entreated her husband
to leave and separate from his wife; that he advised with
lawyers as to the best method by which a separation and divorce
could be secured, wrote letters to plaintiff's husband urging and
entreating him to separate from her immediately ... ,. White
v. White, (Kan.) 90 P. 1087.
rr •••

14
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by coaxing and by threatening and by other methods,
separated plaintiff's "rife from him and alienated her affections from the plaintiff, persuaded her_ to bring a divorce ac\t

•••

tion, persuaded plaintiff's wife to remain at their home and
to refuse to go ~o plaintiff ... " Gvirtz v. Leiser, et ux, (Colo.)
58 P. (2) 481.
In the case of Nichols v. Nichols, (Mo.) 35 S.W. 577,
the court said: ((Does the petition state tacts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action? The substantial charge in the
petition is
((that defendant wrongfully induced, influenced and
enticed plaintiff's husband to abandon her, and to
live separate and part from her, thereby depriving,
and intending to deprive her of his affection, comfort, society and support. Defendants insist that this
is but a statement of a conclusion of law; that the
acts done and words spoken should have been stated.
The Code requires the facts which constitute the
cause of action to be stated. A statement of mere
legal conclusions is not sufficient, and, on the .other
hand, a detailed statement of the evidence is not
required . . . . Pomeroy says: (The material facts
which constitute· the grounds of relief . . . should be
averred as they actually took place, and not the legal
effect or aspect of those. facts, and not the mere
evidence or probative matter by which their existence
is established' . . . The ultimate fact which is constitutive of the ~H.~-t of action in this case is that

of wrongfully inducing the husband of plaintiff to
abandon her . . . Wrongfully, inducing plaintiff's
husband to abandon her is a conclusion of fact, depending upon the proof of acts, declarations, and
conduct of defendants. It is not a conclusion of law
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but a fact from which a legal conclusion is to be
d rawn .· .. ''
We submit that the complaint does not set out the ultimate
facts; that it fails to state a claim against the defendant and
that the same should be dismissed. Likewise our motion for a
more definite statement should have been sustained and plain. tiff shquld have been required to a~lege the facts from which
a legal· conclusion is to be drawn. t~Alienated affection of
plaintiff' s· wife" instead of alleging a pure legal conclusion.

POINT TWO
THE VERDICT IS SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THE COURT
ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON
SUCH GROUNDS.
Sub-section ( 5) of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial shall be. granted in case of
ttexcessive· or inadequate damages appearing to have· been
given undner the .influence of passion or prejudice." A reading
of the transcript will indicate that the entire trial was conducted in an atmosphere of· passion and prejudice. Judge
Hoyt was evident! y so shocked by the admitted conduct of
the defendant that his prime purpose in the trial appears to
have been to inflict punishment for breach of social customs.
This attitude infected the jury and resulted, along with evi16
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.. dence improperly admitted, in a grossly excessive total verdict
of $7?,000.00. Dr. Oldroyd was tried by the jury only incidentally for his conduct in regard to the plaintiff's wife. The
excessive judgment was returned against him principally for
the unforgiveable offense o{ being a more than average wellto-do man in a small town. It would be surplusage to go
into the question of small town prejudices in such matters.
CounseL and most members of the court, have at various times
in their lives resided in small towns and are fully aware of
the prejudice formed by resident~. of small towns against the
more affluent citizens. It is true, of course, that the court
incidentally at the end of Instructio.n No. 9 (a) instructed
the jury that the evidence admitted of the defendant's wealth
should be considered only in regard to punitive damages and
not in regard to compens~tory damages. The futility of such
an instruction, however, is evident. It is difficult, if not impossible, for even a person with a trained legal mind to ·
exclude entirely a known fact from consideration of a problem
in regard to which his emotions and prejudices tell him such
a fact is material.
Counsel has been able to discover few cases in the entire
history of jurisprudenc~ in th~ United States where a verdict
as la~ge or larger than this ~n alienation of affection suit
has been returned by a jury.
In the case of Oskamp v. Oskamp, 152 NE 208, decided
by the Ohio Appellate Court in 1926, a judgment for $100,000.00 for alienation of the affections of a. husband was reduced by the Court to $75,000.00.
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In that case, how~ver, the circumstances were aggravated.
There were several defendants whom it was alleged had conspired together to alienate the affections of the plaintiff's
husband. The trial court directed the jury· that they could
return punitive damages only if there were actual malice.
Evidently the court felt that actual malice was proved because
the · Appellate Court· having heard this instruction, upheld
the verdict under the e~idence. As will be hereafter pointed
out in this case, there is no evidence of actual malice but
rather evidence which would negative even the possibility
of a finding of implied malice.
In the case of Mohn v. Tingley, 217 Pac. 73i3, a judgment
of $100,000.00, $75,000.00 compensa.tory and $25,000.00
.punitive damages, was rendered. The appelate court allowed
the judgment to stand, however, the court found that the
evidence showed a malicious and persistent course of conduct
on the part of the defendant to engender ill will between the
husband and wife and his child. Furthermore, the evidence
showed that in addition to his conduct toward the plaintiff's
wife, the defendant had induced the plaintiff to contribute
almost $300,000.00 to a society of which the defendant was
the head.
In the case of Scharwath v. Brooks, 145 Atl. 727, a judgment of $90,000.00 was returned in favor of a wife for the
alienation of her husban4' s affections. This verdict was set
aside by the appellate court as being excessive and a new trial
was ordered. The case· was again tried and a jury returned a
verdict of $70,000.00. It was again appealed and at 150 Atl.
211 the court again set aside the verdict as excessive and
1M
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stated in its opinion that a verdict of $20,000.00 would have
been ample and generous.
In the case of Overton v. Overton, 246 Pac. 1095 (an
Okla. case) the jury returned a verdict of $150,000.00 for
alienation of the affections for the plaintiffs ·husband, $120,000.00 of such verdict being the compensatory damages and
$30,000.00 for punitive damages. The evidence showed that'
the plaintiff's husband and the defendant were married after
the plaintiff had secured a divorce from her husband. The
appellate court ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff filed a
remittitur reducing the judgment to the sum of $40,000.00.
An analysis of the cases reported will indicate that the
vast majority of judgments for alienation of affections, even
in cases showing a wanton and wilful course of conduct
marked by seduction, are under $25,000.00 in amount and
even in these cases the courts have frequently- set aside such
judgments as excessive and returned the case for a new tria]
or ordered a remittitur of a portion of the judgment.

The Supreme Court of California in the case of Slaughter
v. Van Winkle, 2 Pac. (2) 789, reduced a $6,000.00 judgment
to $3,000.00 where a husband had sued his wife's aunt for
alienation of his wife's affections.
In the case of Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 Atl. 692, the
plaintiff discovered the defendant and his wife in a condition
which indicated that sexual intercourse had taken place between the two. The plaintiff went for a policeman and was at
tacked by the defendant's chauffeur. The defendant thereupon
had the plaintiff arrested for blackmail and the plaintiff was
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actually imprisoned for two days awaiting trial. He was later
acquitted of the blackmail charge and later brought an action
for alienation of affection against the defenqant. The jury returned ·a verdict of $20,000.00. Although in Connecticut the
law as to punitive damages is that such are limited to the
expenses of litigation there is no such limitation on compensatory damages. The trial court, nevertheless, set aside the
verdict as being excessive and an appeal was taken. The appellate court held that the verdict should have been set aside
only conditionally and that it should have been allowed to
stand for the amount of $10,000.00 provided the plaintiff
would accept·· this amount. The language of the appellate
·court is revealing:
((Comparison of the facts in these cases and the
avv-ards therein with those in the present instance, with
due consideration of recent developments, including the
diminished purchasing power of money, discloses no
logical or legitimate justification for verdicts for the
amounts awarded in the present case.
Extending our investigation to other jurisdictions,
we find few cases in which verdicts of such amount
have been sustained, and that notwithstanding prevalence. of the common-law doctrine permitting the award
of punitive damages, in amount practically at the discretion of the jury, while in this state the purpose is
not to punish the defendant for his offense, but to con1pensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and so-called
punitive or exemplary damages cannot exceed the
amount of the plaintiff's expenses of litigation, less
taxable costs."
In the case of Richards v. Lorleberg, 79 Fed. (2d) 413,
the appellate court of the District of Columbia reduced a
20
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verdict of $30,000.00 to $18,000.00. Certiorari was denied
by the S~preme Court of the United States. 296 U.S. 242.
In the case of Lindenberger v. Klapp, 254 Ill. App. 192,
a verdict of $90,000.00 was originally returned. On order of
the trial court the plaintiff had agreed to remit $45,000.00
of the amount. On appeal the appellate court held that the
original verdict had been so grossly excessive that it was
evident that the· jury was governed by prejudic~ or passion and
that even the reduced verdict should not have been allowed
to stand. The entire verdict was then set aside.
The Supreme Court of Main in Allen v. Rossi, 146 Atl.
692 set aside as being excessive a judgment of $6,474.17 for
alienation of a wife'·s affection coupled with criminal conversation.
In the case of Elmeier v. Elmeier, 231 N.W. 532, the
Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska reduced a $9,000.00
verdict to $6,000.00 for .alienation of a husband's affections.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington in the·
case of Wood v. Miller, 265. P. 727, held a $2o,ooo.o'o verdict
grossly excessive and remanded the case for a new trial. In
the same court in the case of Essig v. Keating, 291 Pac. 323,
a $12,500.00 verdict for alienation of a wife's affections was
reduced to $5,000.00. The same court two years later, in the
case of Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Pac. (2d) 617, reduced a
$7500.00 verdict to $5000.00.
In the case of Clark v. Orr, 173 So. 155, the· Supreme
Court of the State of Florida reduced a $25,000.00 verdict in
favor of a wife for alienation of her husband's affections to
21
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$5,000.00. In the. same year in the case of Mallory v. Edgar,
175 So. 863, a judgment of $35,900.00 was held excesstve

and was set aside by the Florida court.
A fairly recent case is the Idaho_ case of Summerfield v.
Pringle, 144 Pac. (2) 214, where a $50,000.00 judgment,
divided $35,000.00 compensatory and $15,000.00 punitive
damages, was reduced by the court to $20,000.00 compensatory
and $.1,000.00 punitive. The evidence in that case showed
that the defendant was worth about $300,000.00, considerably more than the evidence indicates that Dr. Oldroyd is
worth. This case was decided by divided court, three to two.
The minority opinion ·held that the verdict was so grossly
excessive that it should have been set aside entirely rather
than to be reduced. The majority opinion, however, points
out several facts which the court held justified the verdict
in the reduced amounts. First, it pointed out that as the wife
of her former husband,· the plaintiff would have been entitled to share with him an inheritance of some $150,000.00.
Furthermore, the evidence showed that at the time she married her husband, the plaintiff had sold a home in California
and had invested the proceeds from the sale of this home in
a farming operation on a farm which she and her husband
were renting from the defendant. The evidence further shows
an extreme case of actual malice toward the plaintiff on the
part of the defendant, a situation entirely lacking in the case
now being considered.
In the case of Ruske v. Ruske,_ 92 Fed. Supp. 348, decided
tn 1951, a $7,000.00 verdict was reduced by the court to
$4,000.00.
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An excellent summary of the cases decided prior to 1930
is found at 69 A.L.R. beginning on page 1279 and continuing
to page 1295. An examination of the cases there annotated will
show that few awards in cases of this kind have exceeded $10,000.00 and that almost without exception those in excess
of this amount which have been sustained by the court have
been accompanied by aggravated circumstances, usually by
adultery. ·
So far as counsel is able to determine, this court has never
passed direct! y upon the question of excessive damages in an
alienation of affection suit. The two cases involving damages
in an action of this type which have been before the court
were reversed on other grounds. However, in the case of
Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah, 77, 197 Pac. 605, the Court, ·
after having reversed the verdict because of improperly excluding evidence, placed in its ·opinion ·the following very
interesting dicta regarding the $25,000.00 judgment:
{(We have not commented upon the evidence for the
reason that the case will probably be tried again. It is,
therefore, neither necessary nor advisable to express
an opinion as to whether this palpably exce~sive verdict
should be held to be inoculated with the virus of passion
and prejudice."
There is no question of loss of support in this case as
we have in the case where the affections of a husband are
alienated; and yet the verdict in this case is a great deal
larger than has ever been sustained in this court for an action
brought by a wife for the wrongful death of a husband and
bread-winner.
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Counsel urges that a mere redetermination of the verdict
in this case by this court would not serve the ends of justice.
The verdict is so unreasonably large as to indicate conclusively
that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice. Where
a verdict is excessive, but not so grossly excessive as to indicate
passion and. prejudice, the method usually followed by the
courts is to reduce the _verdict. However, where it is so grossly
excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice a reversal and
a new trial is the proper remedy.
This court has recognized this principle in the recent case
of Wheat v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 250 Pac. (2d), 932,
where the court, after having discussed an earlier optnton
regarding reductions of excessive verdicts, stated:
nNotwithstanding what was said therein, we regard
the true rule to be that if the verdict is so excessive as
to show that it must have been motiviated by prejudice
or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as
anger, resentment, indignation or some kindred emotion has so overcome or . distorted the jury's reason
that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or punitive,
it should be unconditionally set aside."
In this case the size of the verdict itself when considered
against the background of the facts of the case is so clearly
excessive as to indicate that the whole trial was colored with
passion and prejudice. The size of the verdict, however, was
not the only thing in the case that· indicated passion and prejudice. Other points going to establish this proposition will be
hereafter discussed in this brief.
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POINT THREE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN AVER~
DICT OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT,
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN Ft:~lri~t- ~
TIFF'S FAVOR AND IN FAILING .TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS
._

4~

.~!:~T_~E~~~:~.~·:;t,:{f-~7.;=4

~ it is true that the jury is the excZive judge of

the evidence and may believe what evidence it chooses. to
believe regardless of where the preponderance of the evidence
lies so far as the number of witnesses is concerned, the jury
may. not disbelieve a portion of the plaintiff's own evidence
while finding for him on other proposit~ons, nor may it, with~
out good reason, disregard entirely uncontradicted evidence
on the pait o£ the defendant .
. In this ~ase there is an absolute absence ·of any proof of
financial loss to the plaintiff by reason of he claimed acts of
the defendant. What· then does the award of $50,000.00
compensatory damages represent; is it. pain and suffering,
humiliation or loss of association with plaintiff's wife up to
the time his wife obtained a divorce? Does .it represent both
mel} tal and physical pain· and suffering as instructed by the
I
court in Instruction No.8? Does it include as Instruction No. 8
implies, disruption of his family life when his divorce from
his former wife had become final more than six months prior
to the time such instruction was given? Is it conceivable that
plaintiff is entitled to any substantial amount because of mental
or physical pain and h~miliation, when we conside~ that the .
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plaintiff, after the trial of the divorce case, and before the
entry of the interlocutory degree, according to his own testimony, Tr. 199, took another woman with him to Salt Lake
City in order to turn over his daughter to his former wife
(Tr. 199). And when it is remembered that plaintiff, according to his own testimony, during the time he was the legal
husband· of Geraldine Back Wilson, took another woman to
4ances, shows, and on numerous occasions visited her in her
·•
apartment? (Tr.~ 199).
What pain and mental suffering, what humiliation, did
plaintiff suffer justifying such an award? The injury to plaintiff in this case was an injury to his ego. His conduct throughout his entire life leads to but one conclusion, that he felt his
wife should be happy just to be his wife, and that he had
no obligation to try and make her happy. The testimony in
this case does not justify damages in any amount against the
plaintiff.
Certanily the plaintiff is not entitled to an allowance in
damages which would be proper. where the affections of a
woman who was madly in love with a kind, considerate, and
loving husband were ·stolen by one who pursued her, and
by gifts, blandishments and false accusation against her husband, induced her to give herself to him and debauched her.
As was said by the Massachusetts Court in the case of

Palmer v. Crook: '1 ~tilt:

(( . . . If the defendant invaded domestic peace, destroyed conjugal felicity, and .by his solicitations alienated and seduced the wife's affections from a kind and
tender husband, he inflicted a much. more grievous
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\Yrong and incurred a far heavier penalty in dan1ages,
than he \VOuld have done if love and harmony and affectionate intercourse had been previously impaired
or lost, through the misconduct and cruel treatment of .
the husband . . . ''
It is made clear by the record in this case, that the verdict
of the jury was not against -defendant because he alienated
the affections of plaintiff's wife, but rather because defendant
and plaintiff's wife were infatuated with each other.
As stated in the case of Berger v. Levy (Cal.) 43 P (2)
610, where the lower court was reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial, the Court said:
tt (

1, 3) The gist of a cause of action of this kind is

the enticing or taking away of the husband or the wife
and the alienation of his or her affections . . . And it
has been held that the word entice means to lureJ induceJ
temptJ inciteJ or persuade a person to do a thing ... "
({However, as declared in the leading case, (Ky.) 16
LRA, (New Serial), 742 . . . it is well settled that
there is no ground for action where a spouse voluntarily gives his or her affection to another} the latter
doing nothing wrongfully to win such affection. That
is to say, in order to establish liability it must be shown
that the defendant is the enticer, and mere proof of
abandonment, or that the husband or wife may be
maintaining an improper relation with another is not
sufficient. In this regard the Court in that case goes on
to say: ((In 15 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 895, the
rule is thus stated: (In order to sustain an action for
the alienation of the husband's affections it must appear in addition to the fact of alienation or the fact
of the husband's infatuation for the defendant, that
there had been a direct interference on the defendant's
part, sufficient to satisfy the jury that the alienation
was caused by the defendant, and the burden of proof
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is on the plaintiff to show such interference.' Again, on
page 866 it is said (but to maintain this action it must be
established that the husband was induced to abandon
the wife by some active interference on the part of
the defendant.' In 3 Elliott on Evidence, Section 1643,
it is said: (To entitle the plaintiff to recover in an action
for alienating affections, the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must show that there
was a direct interference upon the part of the defendant
that not only was there infatuation of the husband or
wife for the defendant, but that the defendant by
wrongful act was the cause of it.' In the case of Waldron v. Waldron (C.C.) 45 F. 315, the court, in an
elaborate discussion of the question said: ( ·. .· . If the
husband alienated his own affections from his wife, or
if alienated by the plaintiff's own conduct, or both,
without the interference of defendant, or if they were
alienated by any other cause known or unknown, over
which defendant had no control or exercised no intentional direction or influence, then the plaintiff,
howsoever unfortunate or wronged, cannot recover
damages from the defendant.' " See also, 13 R.C.L.
1464, and 30 C.J. 1123.
There is no causal relation between plaintiff's ~oss of
the affections of his wife and any act or acts of the defendant.
Defendant probably breached the social standards espo~sed by. the trial judge and jury, but the breach of those
standards was not the cause of the alienation of plaintiff's
wife's affections. Plaintiff lost her affections not because of
any act or word of the defendant. They were gone when defendant acted. He made love, not to a wife devoted to plaintiff,
but to one who had lost all respect she had for him. We shall
refer in some detail to the evidence which sustains our contention.
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At the outset there is such conflict and confusion in plaintiff's statements that we cannot present a very logical or coherent picture, neither could plaintiff. · Plaintiff testified that
he was happy with his wife until the latter part of November,
1950. That Hwith one or two exceptions I had never gone
to bed in my life with Geraldine that when we went to sleep
she didn't turn over and say, t~oney, I love you,' and I would
do the same to her-tWell, goodnight, Honey, I love you,'
and we would turn over and. go to sleep, and that was from
the beginning up until the latter part of November, 1950"

(Tr. 98).
Plaintiff called Mrs. Louise Harmer. She testified that
she and her husband had been with· the Wilsons four or five
times a week, either in Wilsons' home or the Harmers' home,
for the last five years. That she did not observe any difference
ill the attitude of the Wilsons toward each other during that
period until after Mrs. Wilson went to California in the
latter part of January, 1951 (Tr. 31 ).
Plaintiff testfieid that up to the time has wife was operated
on in January, 1951, that he and his wife were very happy.
c] didn't know of anyone that enjoyed the companionship that
we did, of going places and doing things, that we did ·
(Tr. 95-96).
Plaintiff testified, however, that he knew in November of
1950 that his wife was dressing up and going into town at
five or six in the evening, so as to meet the doctor as he went
into the post office or the drug store. He knew at that .time
that his wife was attempting to intercept Dr. Oldroyd.

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff testified that he did not know what was carrying
on until January 22, 1951, when he got the letter from the
post office (Tr. 194) ~
Yet plaintiff testified that early in January, 1951, his wife
told him she loved Dr. Oldroyd (Tr. 137-8). That he learned
that his wife's affections for him were gone immediately after
she came fron1 the hospital in January, 1951 (Tr. 137).
Plaintiff testified that early in January, 1951, his wife told him
she didn't love him or care for him (Tr. 137).
Plaintiff testified that he and his wife discussed getting
a divorce in 1942, '43, or '44 (Tr. 152). That before the divorce action was filed he struck his wife and used vile and
profane language toward her (Tr. 152).
Plaintiff admitted that in November, 1950, he stated that
his wife was cold and frigid and didn't want to have anything
to do with him (Tr. 242-3).
Plaintiff testified that he never owned a home (Tr. 140).
He likewise testified that his annual income for the ten-year
period prior to 1951 was from $3,000.00 to $7,000.00 a year
(Tr. 141).
Plaintiff testified that he began to be suspicious in October, 1950. That about October 15, 1950 his wife was out
waving at the defendant, dressed up, with a ribbon around her
hair (Tr. 155).
On cross examination he testified as follows:

Q. All right, go ahead, let's see anything else that
showed she was in love with the doctor.
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A. Possibly shortly after that Doctor would go past
our home about eleven o'clock every day, or not
every day, but most days, going down to his field
to feed his stock, and on many occasion I was
at home at the time working on my books, or
dropped in at the home, and I would always see
Geraldine out, with a big ribbon on her hair, and
when Doctor would come past she would both
wave at him and he would wave, and they would
beam all over.
Q. Will you fix the time of that, Mr. Wilson?

A. This is November, late fall (Tr. 135). ,~·.
Plaintiff testified that his suspicions were aroused in 1950
by his wife's actions.
Q. Now this was early in November?

A. Well, it was in November. And her ~onstantly
talking about Dr. Oldroyd. Her dressing up and
going into town five or six o'clock in the evening so
as to meet him or see him as he went into the post
office or into the drug store.
Q. Did you so testify?

A.·Yes, sir.
Q. You knew that your wife was attempting to intercept Dr. Oldroyd as he went to the drug store and
into the post office, Mr. Wilson?

A. That was my observation. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was your belief?

A. Yes, sir (Tr. 197).
Plaintiff, struggling to show improper conduct which
aroused his suspicion, testified to his wife's solicitude when
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she saw the defendant slumped over the wheel of his auto·
mobile in Novmeber, 1950 (Tr. 133-4).
He further testified .that when his daughter had a sore
throat his wife called Dr. Oldroyd, and he was suspicious because the defendant came down to the house with the prescription (Tr. 13,5).
It is undisputed that about September 10, 1950, while
the doctor was operating, he stated that he would like to hurry
and get through because he was going to Zion Canyon that
afternoon to get "his daughter, and Geraldine Wilson stated
to defendant, CtTake me with you," and he said, no. K. If
you are serious." Plaintiff's wife said to defendant, ttls your
wife going?" and defendant answered, nyes," and plaintiffs
wife said, ((Well, count me out." (T~. 74).
All this occurred before there is any evidence of any act
of Dr. Oldroyd ·in regard to Mrs. Wilson.
Plaintiff's wife testified that in 1947 she wasn't in love
with her husband (Tr. 329).
She testified that in May, 1950, her feelings for her husband hadn't changed, that she .wasn't in love with him (Tr.
329).
Mrs. Wilson was asked if she had any modern conveniences in either the big house or the small house, and she testified that she had running water and electricity. That she had
an old washing machine given to her by her grandmother,
but it leaked, and she had to put buckets under it every time
she washed so that the water wouldn't run onto the floor (Tr.
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331). She testified that she asked Dale to buy her a washing
machine but he didn't (Tr. 331).
That she had two or three different reasons for gotng
to work. One reason was that was the only way she could get
a few necessities. The next reason was, nAt the hospital I was
respected a little bit. I had no respect at home. I was respected
for the ability I had and not called down all the time" ( T r ~
332). Asked what necessities she referred t~ she answered,
ttWell, to buy some furniture for the house-we were using
everyone's old cast-offs. I had to buy a vacuum ·cleaner, we
were using Dale's mother's old vacuum that she had discarded
two or three years before, but it didn't work. I· had to buy a
washing machine. I had to buy myself an iron. I had to get my-:self a few clothes. I bought a chair or two. I bought a carpet.
I helped to purchase the car .... "(Tr. 332).
Mrs. Wilson was asked if they discussed divorce.
A. We discussed it many times. We discussed it again
in 1947. We discussed it again in 1950. We discussed it in 1951 (Tr. 336).
Mrs. Wilson testified that Dr. Oldroyd had given her
$20.00 at Christmas while she worked at the hospital. That
he gave several of the nurses money. She testified that he gave
her no property or gifts; that he had never asked her to go
any place with him. She testified that she asked him to take
her; that the doctor never asked her to leave the plaintiff ( T r.
337).
Mrs. Wilson testified that the defendant talked with
them about staying together.
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Q. Tell us what was said by the Doctor on that occasion, Mrs. Wilson.
A. Doctor told us to quit acting like a couple of school
kids. That we had two children to raise, why
couldn't we get along and keep our family together (Tr. 341).
She testified that her _husband used physical force an4
violence on her (Tr. 342). That" he came home drunk and
threw a bar of soap at her and hit her (Tr. 344). That shortly
after that he came in from his bedrooni and awakened her
at 2: 3·0 in the morning and said, (What you need is a damn
good licking,'' and he turned her over and started spanking
her. The next time was the day she left, he started to pick a
quarrel again. She called him a name and he struck her in
the face and knocked her across the room ( T r. 344) .
t

Mrs. Wilson testified that her husband accused her of
infidelity (Tr. 346). She testified that she didn't love her
husband in October, 1950 (Tr. 349). She testified that in
October, 1950 she had no affection for her husband, and that
since October 14, · 1950 she still didn't love him. ((Didn't
love him then and don't love him now." She testified that since
October 14, 1950 she had no affection for him (Tr. 350).
Mrs. Wilson was asked the following question, and answered as follows:

Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did the defendant, Dr. Oldroyd,
do anything to cause the alienation of your affections towards your husband, Dale Wilson?
A. No, he didn't. Dale had already alienated his own
affections (Tr. 351). The Court struck out the latter
part of the answer.
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Plaintiff's attitude toward his wife is disclosed by his testimony that he took women to dinner, shows, and dances during
the time he was married to Geraldine Beck Wilson and before
there is any accusation that she had any association with Dr.
Oldroyd (Tr. 144).
It is undisputed that on January 24, 1951, the plaintiff
wrote his wife at Riverside, California, requesting her to re-.
turn to Payson and told her if she would he would treat her
as a husband should treat his wife, .he would treat her better
(Tr. 186).
Plaintiff testified that he and his wife had quarreled about
a man other than the defendant, in the summer of 1950 (Tr.
186). The evidence discloses that since January 24, 1951, the
only interest or affection plaintiff had for his wife was the
dollars he thought he could get (Tr. _189).
We submit that the record justifies the conclusion that
plaintiff's wife would have obtained a divorce from plaintiff
had she never known Dr. Oldroyd, because of plaintiff's
treatment of her. This law suit would not have been filed if
plaintiff had not, by trick and deceit, obtained the letter written
by Dr. Oldroyd and never.received by Mrs. Wilson.
The letter didn't add any suspicion or give plaintiff any
additional knowledge. He had been advised that this wife
had no affection for him some time before that date. It
merely gave a club to plaintiff with which to work on the
defendant. He knew he had lost his wife. He knew she didn't
love him-had no affection for him. He knew that he had
never done anything to retain or regain her love. The crocodile
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tears shed by plaintiff, as disclosed in the record (Tr. 107),
were not because of his loss of his wife's affections. Upon
receipt of that letter plaintiff waged a campaign to take the
doctor.
His testimony, shown at page 118 of the transcript, justifies such ·a conclusion.
He said:
CCDoctor, I am sorry that I got this letter. I hate to
· have a tuhip of this kind, and hate to be forced to
use a whip to have you leave my wife alone, and let
my wife come back to me ... but I have got it, and
now we both know that the truth is out . . . and let's
forget the. thing, and not carry it any further . . .
W el, Doc, I might hav~ to sue you for all you have
got if you don't leave my family alone. We talked back
and forth in a s.ort of kidding way." (Tr. 118).
Plaintiff asked defendant to write to plaintiff's wife and
ask her to come back and said that if he did everything would
be fine. A letter was written by defendant to plaintiff's wife
urging her to come back (Tr. 121).
Plaintiff testified that the conversation above set out
was had on the 21st or 22nd of January (Tr. 117). But the
evidence is undisputed that the letter was not mailed until
January 21 (Tr. 112).
It is significant that within a day or two after defendant
wrote the letter to plaintiff's wife that plaintiff had a conversation with Lee Nebeker, his cousin, and a lawyer. Planitiff
testified that he said, CtLee, I am not interested in this as a law
suit. I am concerned with my children, and Geraldine is going
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to go her way and I am going mine ... $10,000.00 or $15,000.00
\vouldn' t hurt the Doc very much and it would set those kids
up and insure an education for them, and that would be as
far as I would be interested in going'' ( T r. 190) .
The letter received by plaintiff did not give plaintiff the
information that his wife was in love with the defendant;. it
did not inform him that his wife had no affection for plantiiff;
plaintiff's wife had advised plaintiff of that long before.
What compensatory da~ages is plaintiff entitled to when
we consider that no act or word of the defendant caused plaintiff's wife to los.e or transfer her affections? The mental pain
and suffering which plaintiff sustained can best be measured
when we consider his testimony that he visited another woman,
took her to dinner, to shows, to dances, and visited with her
in 4er apartment, on many occasions during the time he was
the husband of Geraldine Beck Wilson (Tr. 199).
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife, in 1943, told her
father that she had lost all her love and respect for the plaintiff, and didn't want to live with him any longer (Tr. ·264).
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife told her father, in
1947, that she wanted to get a divorce,· that she didn't love
the plaintiff any more, and had lost all respect f~r him ( T r.

265).
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife told her father in
May, 1950, that sh~ had left Dale, that she was through, that
she wasn' ~ going to go back to Dale any. more, that it was
just a waste of time, doing them both an .injury, living under
the circumstances as they were doing (Tr. 265-6).
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Plaintiff's wife testified that in a phone conversation with
defendant's wife, in ]an1:1ary, 1951, that she said, (tAll we
have done for years is fight and quarrel, and we are going to
get a divorce (Tr. 353).
Counsel for plaintiff asked Mrs. Wilson the following
questions and she gave the following answer:

Q. What did you mean when you said you lost your
affection for Dale?
A. I didn't love him. I didn't like him. I had no respect for him. I didn't like him as a person, as a
husband, I didn't like what he stood for-in other
words, I didn't like him (Tr. 366).
Plaintiff admitted that he asked defendant's wife, about
June 10, 1951, if she had any letters that Geraldine had written
to the doctor and that he said to defendant's wife, ((Well if
you had one I would trade the one Doc wrote to Geraldine
for it" (Tr. 205).
Plaintiff further admitted that he may have said to defendant's wife, (tif I had a letter written to Doctor by Geraldine I could beat Geraldine down in the amount of money
and support money she is asking from me". (Tr. 205-6).
Plaintiff further admitted that he may have said to defendant's wife on June 10, 1951, (tWill you do something for
me? You tell Doc that he had better write and tell Geraldine
to cut down on her demands of me. And if he ever gets her
to cut down on her demands I will not hurt him, but if he
doesn't I will crack this thing wide open with this letter, (Tr.
206-7 and 209).
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Plaintiff admitted that he and his wife attended the
Firemen's New Years Eve Party either in 1948 or '49 and
that Mrs. Wilson said to plaintiff that she was tired and
would like to g~ home and that Sherman Loveless took
his wife home from the party and he remained after she
left (Tr. 207-8). Plaintiff testified that between the time of
his marriage and October 15, 1950, he had taken women other
than. immediate members of his family to dinners, shows and
dances (Tr. 144).
Plaintiff testified that in February, 1951, he stated to defendant's wife over the telephone, nwe just can't get along.
She is my wife legally, but that's all (Tr. 202).
Plaintiff's wife testified that before she left for California
in January, 1951, she talked to her father, Dr. Beck, ovef
the telephone about coming home. That plaintiff's wife was
crying and plaintiff took the phone from her and said to her
father, Dr. Beck, nit's all· my fault, Doc; if I could only keep
my blg mouth shut" (Tr. 355).
From the foregoing facts, one conclusion is inescapable:
the Wilsons were hopelessly estranged long before Dr. Oldroyd ever became involved. Neither cared for the other and
Mrs. Wilson was more than willing to carry on a flirtation with
any man that was attractive to her, whether Dr. Steele or Dr.
Oldroyd. Furthermore, it is obvious that the only value that
Wilson placed on his wife's affection was the dollar and cent
value which he might recover in a lawsuit. Under such circumstances, the case should not even have been submitted to the
jury~ The judge, however, having submitted it to the jury,
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should have set the verdict aside as against the evidence on
the motion for new. trial, ~,...(. #-71. ~.'""' ~ 1?
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POINT FOUR
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICE, WILFULNESS OR WANTONNESS ON THE PART OF THE DE;.
PENDANT TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION OF THE
QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY.
The question of what is required to justify a verdict for
punitive damages in an alienation of affections suit is, so far
as counsel can ·determine, a question of first impression before·
this court; however, the court has considered the tnatter of
punitive dab;lages in actions of other types. The rule as to
punitive damag~s in this ~tate is concisely stated by the court
in the ca.se of Haycraft v. Adams, 24 Pac. (2d) 1110. At
page 1115 · the Court states:·
CCExemplary,' punitive, or vindictive damages are such
damages as are in excess of the actual loss,· and are
allowed where a tort is . aggravated by evil motive,
actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud:'
Murphy v. ·Booth, 36 Utah, 285, 103· P. 768, 770.
An examination of the record in this case would convince
even the most biased observer that none of th~ elements set
forth in the above quotation are present. If punitive damages
. are assessable in this case, it would follow as a matter of course
that in any alienation of affections suit punitive damages are
assessable wherever compensation damages are assessable.
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This certainly cannot be the law. Although counsel does not
intend to attempt to justify the conduct of Dr. Oldroyd and
Mrs. Wilson, it is certain that anything less than is actually
shown by the evidence here would not g1ve rise to a cause
of action at all.
The most usual case where punitive damag~s. are awarded·
are in cases where seduction or adultery are concerned. As
was pointeed out in the Statement of Facts, there is no evidence,
or even an intimation, of such conduct in this case. There is
certainly no actual malice shown nor ·any intent on the part of
Dr. Oldroyd to break up the Wilsons' home. Dr. Oldroyd
was and still is a married man, residing with his wife and
family. When it appeared that the Wilsons _were going to
separate, whether as a result of the acts of Dr. Oldroyd,· as
the plaintiff contends, or because of the conduct of the plaintiff
himself, as Mrs. ~ilson contends, Dr. Oldroyd actively interceded in. the matter and attempted to repair the breach and
to persuade. Mrs. Wilson to return to her husband. Where
in such conduct can be found ((evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud?"
The following lat:Iguage is found ·1n Vol. 2 7 of Amer.
Juris., Sec. 546:
(]t has been held incumbent on the plaintiff to show
circumstances of aggravation or malice in addition to
the malice implied by law, in order to justify the awarding of punitive damages, and it has been said that to
warrant. an allowance of such damages, the act complained of must not only be ·unlawful, but also partake of a wanton and malicious ·nature."
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In the case of Eshelman v. Rawalt, 16 A.L.R. 1311, 131
NE 675, the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois stated:
(While the doctrine allowing such damages has
been criticized, and in some states has been repudiated,
it was said in Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Del. 294, that the
doctrine is too firmly rooted in our jurisprudence to
be disturbed. It was said, however, that the rule allo\ving such damages has been severely questioned by many
able jurists, one of whom is Professor Greenleaf, and
the courts, recognizing the doctrine within its proper
scope, ought to exercise a high degree of watchfulness
to prevent it from being perverted and extended beyond
the real principles upon whic;h it is based, by allowing
plaintiff, through the instrumentality of instructions
to the jury, to characterize the acts of the defendant
with degrees of enormity and turpitude which the
law does not affix to them. The universally recognized
rule where the doctrine is in force is that such damages
may be recovered only in cases where the wrongful
act complained of is characterized by wantoness, malice, oppression,- or circumstances of aggravation."
Chicago v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, 95 Am. Dec. 590; Pearson v.. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 32 Am. St. Rep. 113, 29 N.E.
854.
Even though most of the jurisdictions in the country still
permit the recovery of punitive or exemplary damages in
various types of tort action, the courts generally agree that the
allowance of such damages is foreign to our theory of the
purpose of a legal act.ion which is fundamentally to make
the injured party whole and not to reward him for the fact
that he happens to have been injured. In some jurisdictions
punitive damages are barred by statute, while almost everywhere the tendency seems to be to restrict the application of
this principle wherever possible. As pointed out above the
t
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law in Utah appears to be well established that where malice
is made a basis for the recovery of such damages it must be
actual malice shown by evidence independent of the mere
fact that the act complained of was committed. In some jurisdictions in case of alienation of affections action, the malice
need not be actual malice but may be implied from the facts
of the particular case. In these jurisdictions the court generally gives lip service to the theory that malice may be implied
from the intentional doing of a wrongful act. However, the
courts then generally go on to say that" the act must be wilful
or wanton. The term wilful, as it appears to be applied in
these cases, does not merely mean volitionally but means
something more-not merely an intentional doing of an act
which might in the minds of reasonable men result in an injury
to another individual ,but the actual intent to inflict the injury
which actually does result.
The state of Colorado appears to be one of the most
liberal states in the union so far as the allowance of punitive
damages in alienation of affections actions. There are several
Colorado cases touching upon this point. A mere reading of
the language of some of these cases might lead one to the
conclusion that no greater intent is necessary to sustain a
judgment for punitive damages than is necessary to sustain
a cause of action for compensatory damages. An actual examination of the facts of the cases, however, reveal that in each
case where punitive damages are allowed there is much more
than a mere doing of an act which might cause the transfer
of affection from the wife to another person. In each ·case
there is an affirmative intent to accomplish such transfer of
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affections. As has been pointed out previously, tn the case
now before the court, the relationship between Dr. Oldroyd
and Mrs. Wilson appears to have been an emotional attach. ment. which grew up largely as a ·result of their proximity
in their work. There is no intent, motive or design on the
. part of Dr. 0 ldroyd to cause a lessening~ of Mrs. Wilson's
affections for her husband or to cause her to leave bini. The
worst that can be said about Dr. Oldroyd's actions, so far as
they affect Mrs. Wilson, is ·that the. doctor failed to give
proper consideration to the po~sible con.sequences of a display
of affection for Mrs. Wilson.
A number of states in the union have by statute taken
away any cause of action for . alienation of affections. Still
another group have taken away the right to punitive damages
in such cases, while in the great majority where punitive
damages are permitted_,_ a wanton state of mind, usually accompanied by seduction is required in order to justify the
return of a verdict for punitive damages. Although as stated
above, the Supreme Court of this state .has never passed upon
this question in an alienation of affections suit, the general rule
appears to be well established that there must be present evil
motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud,
which elements are all conspicuously lacking_ in the case now
before the court.
POINT FIVE·
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE FINANCIAL
WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT.
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, So far as counsel is able to 'determine this Court has
not decided the question of \Vhether or not evidence of the
financial \Vealth of the defendant is competent as going to the
amount of punitive damages. There appears to be a split of
authority in the various jurisdictions in this country upon this
question. Some jurisdictions hold that the wealth of the defendant is in no case competent as going to the question of
damages. See Texas Public Utliities Corp. v. Edwards, 99
S.W. 420. In other jurisdictions, however, such evidence is
received on the theory th~t the jury or the court must know the
financial situation of the defendant in order to properly assess
punitive damages for the reason that damages which might
be trivial to a rich man would be ruino'us to a poor man. However, it is uniformly held that the wealth of the defendant is
not material to the question of actual damages and that before
evidence of· the defendant's ·wealth may be admitted, there.
must be evidence in the record which would justify the imposition of punitive damages.
In·the case of Jones v. Carter, 7 So. (2d) 519, the Supreme.
Court of Mississippi reversed a case on ~he grounds that evidence of the defendant's wealth was admitted when there was
not a sufficient showing to justify the imposition of punitive
damages. They held that such matters should be considered
in connection with the assigned error that the verdict was
grossly excessive. The language of the Court is as follows:
nit should 'also be noted that over the objection of
the defendant, he was asked as to how much money he
had, where it was being kept, and about a transfer to
his daughter of a portion of a deposit of money in a
bank, and was also questioned about the conveyance
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of some real estate to his son, all before any testimony
had been introduced as to the facts and circumstances
in connection. with the accident.
Proof of the financial worth of the defendant in such
cases is wholly inadmissible except where punitive
damages are recoverable. There is no basis for even
a suspicion that the defendant would be liable for
punitive damages in the case at bar, nor was this suit
for discovery or to set aside alleged fraudulent conveyances. Obviously such· testimony was highly prejudicial to the defendant, and while not directly assigned
as error on this appeal, the Court may under Rule 6
of the Rules of the Court tat its option notice a plain
error not assigned or distinctly specified.' We exercise
the option to notice the error here in connection with
the argument that the verdict is excessive and contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.''
It is elementary that where certain evidence is material
only under a certain theory of a case, such evidence may be
admitted only where the basic evidence to sustain such theory
is before the court. As has been pointed out above, an instruction to the jury that they may consider the defendant's wealth
when fixing punitive damages but may not consider it when
fixing compensatory damages is futile. It is obvious that if
such information is before the jury, it will color their entire
deliberations, and no better evidence of that fact can be found
than the judgment in this particular case. If a plaintiff were
permitted to give evidence of the financail wealth of a defendant merely because. the plaintiff had pleaded a case for exemplary damages, then in all tort cases where a defendant was
a man of greater wealth than the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
plead that he was entitled to punitive damages regardless of
46
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the evidence so that he could get before the jury evidence of
the defendant's wealth in the hope that it would color their
deliberations as to compensatory damages. Counsel submits
that if it be held that there was not sufficient evidence to justify
the return of a verdict for punitive damages, the court erred,
not only in submitting that question to .the jury, but also in allowing evidence of the defendant's wealth to be introduced
in evidence.

POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED ON INSTRUCTING THE JURY
IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:
(a) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTIONS
NUMBERED 4, 5, 6, and 7 THAT THEY SHOULD
FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THEY FOUND
THAT THE DEFENDANT PERSUADED THE
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE TO DESERT OR LEAVE THE
PLAINT~FF.

The instructions to the jury given by the court in this
case read more like an indictment of the defendant than like
an impartial discourse on the law applicable to the case. Instructions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 restate and reiterate for the purpose
of emphasis to the jury, the circumstances under. which they
may return a verdict for the plaintiff. In each of these instructions, the court states a number of situations in the alternative,
any one of which will justify the return of a verdict for the ·
plaintiff. In each of the instructions the court instructs the
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jury that it may return a .verdict for the plaintiff if they find
that the defendant intentionally encouraged the plaintiff's
wife to desert or cease her association with the plaintiff as his
wife. It is submitted that there is no evidence in the case indicating such actions or such intent on the part of the defendant.
In fact, the undisputed evidence is to the effect that Dr. Oldroyd encouraged the plaintiff's wife to remain with him.
It is well established law that it is erroneous to give an
abstract instruction not based upon evidence in the case even
though the state~ent of law contained in such instruction is
correct as such an abstract principle. With the question of
· whether or not such an instruction might be correct in some
cases of alienation of affections, we need not concern ourselves
here, for it is obviously not a proper instruction to be given
in this case, and the· giving of it might well mislead the jury.
In the case of Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 Pac. 653,
the court reversed. anq remanded for a new trial a verdict in
the lower court for the reason that the court had given an
abstract instruction of law to the jury which was not based
upon any evidence in the case.
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Ut. 3·66, 270
Pac. 349, the court in reversing and remanding for a new
trial a verdict in the lower court stated:
((Paragraph 13 likewise is erroneous. Whether as
an abstract proposition such a charge is correct, the
authorities are in conflict. We need not now and do
not determine whether as an abstract proposition such
a charge is or is not correct or the circumstances when
a charge concerning such a subject may properly be
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given. It is enough to say as we do that there is not
anything in the record to render such a charge applicable * * * ~ Thus the charge falls within the familiar
rule that it is error to give instructions based on a
state of facts which there is no evidence tending to
prove ·or which the undisputed evidence in the case
shows did not exist even though such instructions contain correct statements of law."
For the court to repeat in three different instructions in
only slightly varying language a charge that the jury might
find for the plaintiff, if in fact they found that the defendant
encouraged the plaintiff's wife to leave or desert him, when
the uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that there was no
such action on the part of the defendant, but .that rather the
defendant actively interceded to attempt to get the parties
back together, was clear~y reversible error.
(b) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 6 THAT THE LAW PRESUMES TI-fE
POSSIBILITY OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
· MAN AND WIFE.
Of all the instructions given to the jury, in the opinion of
counsel, instruction No. 6 was the most clearly erroneous and
the most badly damaging to the defendant. As was stated
previously in the brief, as to much of the evidence in the
case, there was no dispute, however, there was a ser.ious dtsput as to the state of the marriage relationship between Dale
Wilson and Geraldine Wilson prior to the time that Geraldine
Wilson became well acquainted with Dr. Oldroyd. If Dale
Wilson's testimony is to be believed, there was no strained
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relationship between himself and wife prior to that time, and
only on such a basis could the jury have found any substantial
damages in the case. On the other hand, Geraldine Wilson's
testimony was that prior to the time she knew Dr. Oldroyd
more than casually, the marriage relationship between herself
and Dale Wilson was already wrecked beyond the possibility
of salvage. If the jury believed this testimony, then, of course,
they could have returned no verdict in favor of Dale Wilson.
These two conflicting sets of testimony were before the
jury and each of the parties had the right to have the jury consider this evidence without any comment· by the court on the
weight of such evidence, or without any supposed rule of
law to give greater weight to the evidence on one side than
to the other. The court instructed the jury as follows:

cyou are instructed. that so long as the marriage
status continues between husband and wife, the la\v
presumes that there is a possibility of a reconciliation
between the parties even though they have become
strained or had marital difficulties."
t

This instruction is equivale~t to saying to the jury: "Even
though the evidence may convince you beyond question that
the marriage between the Wilsons was so strained that it appears that it could not have been repaired, still you way not
find on that basis, for in the eyes of the law so long as the
marriage relationship existed, it may have been repaired and
you may return damages on the basis that it would have been
repaired.''
This court has already reversed and remanded for a new
trial an alienation of affections judgment on an instruction
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almost identical to this one. Because the language of the court
in that case so forcefully argues the position of the defendant
in this case, counsel takes the liberty of quoting extensively
from the language of the court in the case of Buckley v. Francis,
6 Pac. (2d) 188:
~~Defendant

assigns as error the giving of the following instruction to the jury: nyou are instructed that
it "\Vas not necessary for the plaintiff to offer direct
proof of his wife's affections for him prior to the
alleged wrongful acts complained of. The law presumes that a wife who lives with and cohabits vvith·
her husband, she bearing children the issue of such
cohabitation has an affection for him."
In two cases recently decided by this court, the legal ·
effect of a presumption is discussed and decided. State
v.' Green, 6 P. (2d) 177; In re Newell's Estate, .5 P.
(2d) 230. It is held in each of those cases and other
cases there cited that a presumption is a rule of law
which may be relied upon as establishing a prima facie
case for the party in whose favor the presumption exists
until, and only until, the opposing party goes forward
with some evidence which tends to overcome the presumption, that a presumption' cannot stand in the face
of facts, and that, when evidence of facts appears in
cause, the presumption, having served its purpose,
passes utterty out of ·consideration of the trier of the
facts. In those cases we condemned instructions which
directed the jury to undertake the impossible task of
considering and weighing presumptions as if they were
evidence. While the court in the instruction complained of did not expressly direct the jury to consider as
evidence the presumption that a ·wife who lives and
cohabits with her husband has affection for him, the
jury might well have so understood the instruction.
The fact that the wife of the plaintiff was living and
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cohabiting with him at the time of the alleged wrongful
acts of the defendant may be said to tend to support
a finding that she, at that time, had an affection for
him; but it by no means follows, in the light of the
· evidence in the record to the contrary, that she in
fact had such affection. If it may properly be said, as
some courts have said, that there is a presumption
that a wife has affection for a husband with whom
she lives and cohabits, such presumption is founded
upon the facts of living and cohabiting with the husband, and the presumption has no evidentiary force
independent of the facts upon which it is founded.
In this case the jury had before it the evidence that
the plaintiff and his wife were living and cohabiting
together as husband and wife at the time of the alleged
. wrongful acts of the defendant. Such evidence \vas
proper for the jury to consider as bearing upon the
question of whether the wife did or did· not have affection for the husband, but such evidence may not
be aided, strengthened, or rendered irrebutable by
a presumption that she had affection for him. A presumption may not be considered or weighed as evidence in a cause, so likewise, it may not serve the
purpose of either adding weight to or rendering conclusive evidence which has been received in a cause.
The instruction complained of was calculated to mislead the jury into determining the issues of fact, not
upon the evidence alone, but upon the evidence aided
by a presumption favorable to plaintiff's cause. The
plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of a presumption
in aid of his evidence upon the· issue of whether or
not his wife had affection for him at .the time o( the
alleged wrongful acts ·of the defel).dant.
The court erred in giving the instruction complained
of. It follows that the judgment should be, and it
according! y . is, reversed. This cause is remanded to
the district court of Box Elder County, with directions
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to grant a new trial. Appellant is awarded his costs
on appeal."
The giving of instruction No. 6 by the court practically
amounts to a n1andate to the jury to return a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. The giving of this instruction alone, even if
not accompanied by the many other errors, would justify the .
remanding of the case for a new trial.
(c) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Instruction No. 9 (a) is erroneous in t\VO regards. The
Court erred in instructing the jury at all regarding punitive
damages because of the fact that the evidence in the case di,d
not warrant the imposition of punitive damages. As has been
pointed out in the immediately preceding section; it is error
to instruct upon evidence not in the record even though the
instruction of law as an abstract proposition may be correct.
Furthermore, in this case Instruction 9 (a) is not a correct
statement of the law even as an abstract proposition. The
Court instructed the jury <(they (exemplary damages) are allowable under the law as a punishment for wilful and wanton
wrong doing and to set an example to deter others from similar
wilful and wanton acts." Nowhere in its instruction does
the Court instruct the jury as to what is meant by the term
wilful. The understanding of the orinary person as to the term
wilful is an act done intentionally. A jury so instructed, therefore, could find exemplary damages against a person in any
case of negligence. Almost without exception the negligent
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act done is done wilfully, but without an intent to injure; the
negligence being in the failure of the individual to properi y
realize that the injury actually inflicted will flow from the
act intentionally done. It is clear that the term wilful, as applied to punitive damages, means more than the intentional
doing of an act which results in damage to another. It means
the intentional doing of an act with intent to inflict the harm
actually inflicted.
The following language is found at 25 Corpus Juris. Sec.

728:
tcMere negligence in the absence of wantonness,
circumstances of malice, or .other essential aggravating
circumstances will not justify a recovery of exemplary
damages. Such damages may be awarded only where
the negligence complained of is gross."
To instruct the jury that they may return a verdict for
exemplary damages if they find that the defendant's act was
wilful without in any way defining what is meant by a· wilful
act is clearlr misleading and as such did not convey to the jury
a correct understanding of the principles authorizing the imposition of punitive damages.

POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:

(a) IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF GERALDINE
WILSON REGARDING EVENTS AND OCCUR-
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RENCES DURING HER MARRIED LIFE WITH
THE PLAINTIFF, DALE WILSON.
Mrs. Wilson was asked:
Q. Now at that time, Mrs. Wilson, were you and Dale
getting along all right?
l\1r. Sherman Christensen: Object to that, if the court
please, as incompetent, irrelevant and im1naterial,
the witness is disqualified to answer, a confidential
communication or matter between them.
THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that the objection is well taken_ (Tr. 300).
The witness was asked the following question:
Q. I call your attention to 1943. Do you recall if you
left then?
The question was objected to as leading and the objection
was sustained (Tr. 301).
Mrs. Wilson was asked:
Q. Was there any other reason you left?
The. question was objected to as being incompetent, Irrelevant, immaterial and privileged.
THE COURT: She may answer yes or no.
A. Yes.
Q. And what was that?
Mr. Sherman Christensen: Same objection, if the court
please.
THE COURT: Would you state your objection?
Mr. Sherman Christenson: Incompetent, irrelevant and
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immaterial and privileged under the statute as to
the disqualification of confidenital communications.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained (Tr. 302).
The witness was asked:

Q. Now, while you were in Payson, living in Payson,
Mrs. Wilson, what were· the living conditions \'."ith
respect to the home and the things that you were
required to do in your housework?
·The court sustained the objection that the question was
too general and that no time was fixed (Tr. 330).
Reference was then made to the time plaintiff and his
wife moved into the big house and the witness was asked:

Q. What were the conditions with respect to the house
and your duties at that time?
The question was objected to as calling for a conclusion
•
and being duplicituous and the objection was sustained (Tr.
330).
The witness was asked:

Q. Can you state with respect to what you were obliged
to do?
Objection was made that it called for a conclusion, and
the objection was sustained (Tr. 330).
The witness was asked:

Q. I call your attention to about the year '43 or '4·1
and ask you if you and your husband discussed
divorce at that time?
Objection was made that the question was incompetent,
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irrelevant and immaterial, the witness not competent to testify,
and the court sustained the objection (Tr. 336).
The witness was asked:

Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did Dr. Oldroyd ever ask you
to leave the plaintiff?
A. No, he never asked me to leave the plaintiff. He
always encouraged me to stay with him, stay with
my home and take care of my two children.

On motion the court struck out the latter part of answer
(Tr. 337-8).
The witness was asked:
A. Did he ever encourage you to stay with your husband and family?

Objection was made that the question was incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial and hearsay and the court sustained
the objection (Tr. 33,8).
The witness was asked:

Q. Did he ever say anything to you with respect to
staying with his-or your husband?
The court directed the witness to say yes or no {Tr. 339).
A. Doctor told us to quit acting like a couple of school
kids. We had two children to raise, why couldn't
we get along and keep our family together. He had
always encouraged me to stay with Dale (Tr. '341).

On motion the court struck out the latter part of answer
(Tr. 342).
The witness was asked:
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Q. Now, on that date did you have any affection whatever for your husband?
The question was objected to on the grounds that it was
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and privileged and
called for a conclusion. The court sustained the objection on
the ground that it was leading (Tr. 349-50).
The witness was asked:

Q. Did you have any feelings toward him on that day?
The following objection was made: nSame objection, if
the court please. The objection was sustained (Tr. 350).
The witness was asked:

Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did the defendant, Dr. Oldroyd, do anything to cause the alienation of your
affection toward your husband, Dale Wilson?
A. No, he didn't. Dale had already alienated his own
affections.
On motion the court struck out .the latter part of the
answer (Tr. 351).

Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, what caused you to lose your
affection for your husband?
The court sustained the objection on the ground that it
was privileged and a violation of the rule under the statute
(Tr. 352).
The witness was asked:

Q. Mrs. Wilson, did any act or statement of the defendant, Dr. Oldroyd, have the effect upon you
to cause you to lose your love and affection for
your husband or to lessen the love and affection
for your husband?
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Opposing counsel said: HWe object to that," and the
court said:
THE COURT: The court believes questions tn that
form ought not to be asked (Tr. 356-7).
After the court sustained the objection to the question asked, plaintiff's wife was asked why she left the plaintiff (Tr.
303).
The court excused the jury and suggested that we, out
of the presence of the jury, ask the witness questions in order
that the court might determine if that would be proper. The
court observed (Tr. 303):
UThe v1itness may ansv.re_r tha~ question, it being
understood that the jury is out of the courtroom and
that the witness is permitted to answer the question
for the purpose of getting before the court whether
the answer ~s objectionable or not."
The witness answered:
A. I left because I wasn't in love with Dale. I w~s
sick and tired of him. I couldn't stand the sight of
him.
Motion to strike was made. Matter argued and the court
stated (Tr. 304).
THE COURT: You may ask some further questions
of this witness, and indicate how far you wish to
go. Let's see how far you expect to go. The witness will be permitted to answer, but it is understood that the evidence will not go to the jury until
the court has ruled on the pending objection.
As disclosed by the record (Tr. -304-28 inclusive) defendant was directed to ask questions of the witness in order
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that the court might indicate how far we might go. ·The following questions were asked of the witness:

Q. When you were at public functions with Mr. Wilson, or at parties, or other places where other
people were, how did he treat you:
Objection was made and the court said:
THE COURT: The court believes that if· that question were· answered by the _witness reciting what he
said to her at a dance or a show, or something of that
sort, that that. would be a communication, even though
it were in the presence of somebdy else (Tr. 306).
The court further observed: (( . . . it would be the
thought of the court that anything said by the husband to
the wife would be a communication . . ." The court further
volunteered the following observation: HTHE COURT: Counsel would have the right to require you, before she goes on
with any recital of what happened, to bring out the time and
place (Tr. '3·07).
The court requested that the last question asked be read
again and then observed: THE COURT: The court believes
. that that is too general, and calls for a conclusion. It might
be objectionable on those grounds (Tr. 307).
The witness was asked with respect to a visit to her
father's home in 1947 (Tr. 310) as follows:

Q. Now, when you went to your father's in San Francisco, did you intend to come back?
A. No, sir.

Q. Why did you come back?
A. I don't know whether I can testify to this or not.
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Q. Well, did your father have anything to do with it?
A. Yes, he did.

Q. Tell us about that. Why did you come back, without relating the conversation.
A. Well, I was reminded I had two children to raise,
they came first, and it was suggested that I hide
my feelings and try to make a go for the sake of
the children, at least until they were of age.

Q. Who made that suggestion?
A. My father.
Motion was made to strike on the ground that the answer
was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, hearsay and
privileged. Matter was argued. The court then said:
THE COURT: Just a moment. Do you stand on your
objection to that part as hearsay?
Mr. Sherman Christenson: Yes; your Honor .
.THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that would
be objectionable as hearsay. She would not be permitted to testify what her father said to her. Now,
about this point of her intention, did you intend
to go back and have that covered by your objection,
Mr. Christenson ? ·
Mr. Sherman Christenson; On the ground, if the court
please, as privileged.
THE COURT: Any other objection to that? (Tr. 312.
THE COURT: The court would· be inclined to permit
the witness to state her intention at that 'time, but
not to state what her father said or what other
third parties said ( T r. 312) .
The witness was asked:
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Q. And what was your reason for going at that time?

Objection was made upon the usual grounds as well as
privilege and the court observ~d:
THE COURT: It appears to the court that the question
would be improper (Tr. 313).
The witness was asked:
Q. ·Did Dale come down to get you at that time, do you

recall?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did you tell him why you were coming back?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you tell him?

After objection the court

obs~rved:

THE COURT: I am inclined to think that would be
improper to ask the witness (Tr. 313-4).
The witness was asked:
Q. Why did you come back?

THE COURT: I think that objection should be sustained (Tr. 314).
The court further observed with respect to the question
just asked:
THE COURT: What I mean, to call on the witness to
state her motive for doing a given thing, I doubt
would be relevant or competent under the general
rules of evidence (Tr. 314).
The court indicated its position with respect to the line
of questions being asked in the record (Tr. 314-6) after which
the court said:
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THE COURT: You may answer that question yes or no.
A. What was the question? You got me so confused
I don't know (Tr. 316-7.)

Q. Do you know what time I am talking about?
A. This is May, 1950.

Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
A. Did I tell Dale why I was coming back at that time?

Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

Q. And why did you tell him? What said said? What
did you say to him ?
A. I told him if our living conditions could be improved, if his atttuide toward me was different, that I
would come back, and that I would try and make
a home for him and the kids.

Q. And did he say anything to that?
A. He promised me faithfully that conditions all the
way around would be better, I had nothing to
worry about, that he would make an effort to improve our living conditions, and the conditions
under which I had been forced to live, that they
would· be better.

Q. And did you come back?
Motion was made to strike both answers and the court said:
THE COURT: The court believes that the objection
should be sustained (Tr. 317).
The witness was asked about a trip to California in 1947.
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Q. At that ti1ne whether or not you had any love and
affection for the plaintlf£.

Objection was made on the ground that it called for a conclusion. It was incompetent, irrelevant· and immaterial, and
the witness incompetent to testify.
THE COURT: I think. that question would be leading
·
(Tr. 319).
The witness was asked:
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, can you detail for us the condition with . respect to your social life during the
. time you were in Payson?
Af~er

objection· made the court said:

THE COURT: Without making any ruling on the objection I am going to let the witness answer that
question and see what it develops (Tr. 320).
A~

Yes, well, we belonged to a few clubs, we went
out a good deal. We went to our friends' a good
deal?

Q. Any particular friends?

· A. Yes, we used to spend quite a few evenings with
the Harmers .
Q. How marty evenings would you say a week?

A. OhQ. On the average, during the years that you have
vis ted them ?

A. During the years that we were in Payson?
Q. Yes, average· evenings a week during the years
that you were in Payson, did you spend with the
Harmers?.
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A. Well, I would say two or three evenings a week.
I didn't like to spend very many evenings with Dal~
alone. I didn't enjoy his company.
After motion to strike the court observed:
THE COURT: You will not be permitted to testify
as to your li,~es and dislikes, but such matters, I
believe, would be improper. When you are called
upon to tell what you did, keep in mind what you
did, rather than your thoughts (Tr. 320-21).
The witness testified:
Q. On these occasions, Mrs. Wilson, how did your
husband treat you ?
Objection was made and the court said:
THE COURT: I think the general objection to that
question would be good (Tr. 3·22).
The witness was asked about her duties at the home and
among other things testified that she had to do the housework,
chop the kindling, get in the coal and said:
Dale never made that any of his chores . . . I carried water to wash . . . and this was out in a little
back porch with no heat. That is my washing room.
I didn't even have running water out there. And anything that was done around the house I had to do.·
He never was interested in improving the place.
After motion the court struck out as a conclusion the
statement of the witness that her husband was never interested
in improving the place (Tr. 323).
The witness was asked:

Q .Now, Mrs .Wilson, was there anything further
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at this time that you can recall that he did or said
that caused you unhappiness at that time?
A. Well, he didn't do much of anything to make me
happy (Tr. 325).
Motion was made to strike the answer and the court
observed:
THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that answer
like that should be stricken, and that if objection
were made to a question like that it should be sustained, on the ground that it is leading and suggestive . My thought is that you can ask the witness what he did. If the witness avoids reciting what
she said and avoids telling anything that he did
in confidential situations. In other words, she can't
go on with a recital of what he did under confidential .relationships, in the opinion of the court
. (Tr. 325-6).
The court further observed:
THE COURT: If you want to ask the witness in plain
terms, rrw hat were your feelings toward the plaintiff in May} 1947 or 1950", I am inclined to permit
you to ask that question, and have it answered, but
if you ask a question that would lead up to a
recital of a lot of things, that would be objectionable (Tr. 328).
We submit that the court in holding that the witness
might not testify that the plaintiff did.n' t do much of anything
to make her happy committed error.
How else can the conduct of a man be presented? If he
never did anything to make her happy, what else can she say
than he did nothing to make her happy?
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The court threw a straight jacket around the efforts of
the defendant to introduce testimony of plaintiffs wife _much
tighter than Section 78-24-8 ( 1) U.C.A. 1953 authorizes.
We submit that the court's refusal to permit plaintiff's
wife to testify that the defendant never did or said anything
to cause her to lose her love and affection for her husband was
prejudicial error.
Not only did the court deny our right to have the plaintiff's wife testify to matters that we think were not privileged
but the court even suggested to plaintiff's counsel additional
grounds for objection.
Defendant offered to show what the testimony of plaintiff's wife_ would be to questions propounded to her and what
her answers would be to questions propounded to her and what
her answers would be if permitted to answer. These offers
appear in the transcript between page 3 72 to 384.
We offered to show that plaintiff's wife if asked the following questions would give the following answers:

Q. Mrs. Wilson, during your married life and for the
past several years, ~ave you and your husband had
considerable trouble ? ( T r. 372) .
Before the question was answered the court suggested
that counsel make their objections whereupon the question was
objected to on numerous grounds including that of privilege
and the court said:
THE COURT: Do you object to it on the further
ground that it is leading?
With which counsel agreed.
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THE COURT: The court would be inclined to sustain
the objection on the ground that it is leading, and
that it is also in violation of the statute regarding
the competency of. a former wife of a party (Tr.
373).
We offered to shoyv the answer that would be given by
plaintiff's wife to the question asked as· follows:

A. Yes, sir, from time to time we have .had trouble.
We proposed to ask as the next question:

Q. And when did that trouble begin?
A. Well, I would say the first trouble we had was the
first year of our married. life.

Q. Now, have you left Dale at any time during your
marriage before the time you left and went to California-and didn't return?
Her answer would be:
A. The first time I left him. was about 1942, as I recol·
· lect.

Q. And at that time where did you go?
And we offered to show that- the witness would testify
if permitted to testify as set out at the transcript page 375. ·
We next proposed to ask the witness:

Q. Did you make any statement to your grandmother?
(Tr. 376).
Counsel suggested that time and place be fixed and the
·court observed:
THE COURT: Even if the time and place ts fixed,
isn't that hearsay? (Tr. 376).
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We offered to show that her answer would be:
A. I said to grandma: HI simply can't live under those
conditions. I haven't any decent things to do with,
I am living like a pioneer, and I can't do it (Tr.
{376-7).
We proposed to ask the further question:

Q. Why did you return home? (Tr. 377).
After counsel for plaintiff stated that there was no objection the court observed:
THE COURT: Well, that question, tWhy did you return home?' If that is asked, and if there is objection made to it, I call your attention to the fact
it opens up the door for miscellaneous statements,
this puts me in the position of having to sustain the
objection.
We offered to show that the witness would have testified:
A. And Dale came to. Provo and he said ((Geraldine,
Bert has gone. Will you please come· back and try
to get along and things will be different." I wasn't
happy in ·Payson and Dale knew it. But nevertheless I went back, and I said CtO.K., I will try and
·
do it again." (Tr. 378).
Objection was made on the grounds that it was a confidential communication and the court observed:
THE COURT: The court believes that the objection
to that part of the indicated testimony, referring to
what the plaintiff said, or w:hat his wife said on
that occasion, should be sustained, and that the
other should go in, if not objected to (Tr. 379).
We proposed to ask the witness if her husbar:td ridiculed
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her in public and after objection that it called for a conclusion
the court observed:
THE COURT: The court believes counsel should not
be permitted to characterize the evidence, and that
that would be characterization, to ask her what he
said in public about her (Tr. 379).
We proposed to ask the witness ~he question:

Q. Now did you leave the plaintiff, Dale Berkeley Wilson, again?
And the answer to that question would be that she went
to California, left her husband and went to her father's home
in California in 1947 (Tr. 380).
We proposed to ask the witness the question:

Q. Why did you return to Payson from California?
Which her answer would be:
A. My father kept encouraging me to come back. He
said: C«Geraldine, you have got two children. You
have got to consider your children first.. Go back
and hide your feelings, and don't tell anyone." So
I'd go back, and I'd put on a front. By that time
I'd lost every bit of love I ever had for Dale (Tr.
381-2) . .
We proposed to ask the witness if she again returned to
plaintiff to which her answer woul~ be yes (Tr. 382).
The court gave a leading oar to counsel for defendant
and said:
THE COURT: If you strike the word C«again," you will
be permitted to ask it. When you put in those assumptions, if objection is made, the court feels
it should be sustained (Tr. ·3·82).
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We offered to show that the witness would answer:
Yes, I came back and kept telling myselfAnd the court directed that we must ask specific questions
(Tr. 382). We proposed to ask the witness the following question:
Will you state, Mrs. \Vilson, how you felt toward
your husband after you returned from California
in 1947?
We proposed to ask the folowing question:
Will you tell the court what Dale's attitude was after
you returned from California? (Tr. 383).
To \vhich we would expect the witness to answer:
Well, his attitude toward me was the same as it always .
was. He never paid very much attention to me. I
was there. He expected me to be there. I was just
a convenience around the house, as far as Dale was
concerned. He never showed any affection (Tr.
(383-4).
The court made the ·following observations:
THE COURT: The court believes that the offer of the
last question, if answered as just indicated, would
be improper, and that the answer should be stricken
upon motion.
We submit that the court committed error in excluding
testimony of plaintiff's former wife upon the ground of privilege. We believe that the court's ruling and the statement of
the court as to what we might elicit and what we could not
examine her about constituted prejudicial error. The defendant was entitled to show the conditions, relations, and the
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treatment of plaintiff calculated to alienate her affections from
her husband and to present to the jury the· true relationship
between plaintiff and his former wife.
We submit that the court strained the words and intent
of the statute on privilege (Section 78-24-8 (1) U.C.A. 1953}
by ~imiting the witness to testifying to only whether or not
on a given date she had affection for her husband. Without
supplying dressing fot her answe~, the witness was limited to
the colorless word no or yes to be contrasted with the volumes
of pantomime with which plaintiff filled the record over our
objection. The defendant was grossly prejudiced.
The court put in the dams to prevent plalntiff' s wife
showing the conditions under which they lived and. how plaintiff treated his wife and pulled out. the gates ·for plaintiff to
go the limit.
We submit that the rule of privilege cannot be applied
as the court applied it without doing violence to the statute.
This court in Re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah, 456, 261 Pac.
page 15 at page 492 stated:
((Although the statute does not use the term 'confidential cotnmunication · as do the statutes of son1e
of the states, nevertheless, in view of the disclosed pol. icy and reasons for the statutes, we are of the opinion
the communication or knowledge imparted must be
such as pertains to the confidence of the marriage
relation."
In that case this court quoted from Beyerline v. State, 147
, Ind. 125, 45 N.E. 772, page 491, as follows:
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Hit is not every conversation between husband and
\vife, nor every word or act said or done by either in
the presence of the other, that is protected under the
seal of secrecy, but only such communications, whether
by word or deed, as pass from one to the other by virtue
of the confidence resulting from their intimate relations
with one another. Where the criminal, in seeking
advice and consolation, lays open his heart to his wife,
the law regards the sacredness of their relation, and
will not permit her to make known what he has thus
communicated, even as it will not ask him· to disclose
it himself. But if what is said or done by either has no
relation to their mutual trust and confidence as husband
and wife, then the reason for secrecy ceases."
The court in that case quoted the following language from
40 Cyc. at page 491:
C<The rule as to privileged communications does not.
preclude evidence by one spouse as to the personal injury or violence inflicted upon him or her by the other,
or as to ill treatment to which he or she was subjected
by the other spouse.'.'
This court in the case of in Re Estate of Van Alstine, 26
Utah 193; 72 Pac. 962, at page 202, U. R. uses the following
language:
CtWhile the exclusion of confidential communications
between husband and wife is supported by public policy, there is no reason why the surviving wife or husband should be excluded from· testifying, in the maintenance of legal rights, to non-confidential communications, and to any facts the knowledge of which was
not acquired in confidence- through the marriage relation. In the light of the reason of the exclusion, and
in view .of the authorities upon the subject, the pro-.
visions of the statute in question were intended to
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exclude only confidential communications. Knowledge
of the deceased husband's habits and mental conditions
was obtained by his wife by observation, and not from
anything communicated to her in confidence by her
husband. The contention of the proponent under consideration is therefore untenable."
We submit that the court exclusion of the testimony offered
as to the treatment to which plaintiff's wife was subjected by
plaintiff was prejudicial error. The testimony of plaintiff's wife
sets out the kind of treatment which she sustained at his
hands. The things he did which most necessarily have resuited
in her loss of love and affection; the things that h~ failed to
do that a considerate husband would have done was all proper
matter to be presented to the jury..
(b) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO
CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE TESTIMONY. GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IN THE
TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE ACTION AND AT THE
TAKING OF HER DEPOSITION.
The testimony of plaintiff'·s wife given in connection with
the divorce case and in his presence was ·offered for the purpose
of discrediting the allegations ·in plaintiff's complaint that he
and his wife lived together happily until the affections of his
wife were alienated by the defendant, and that during the
period named in the complaint, October 15, 1950. to October
2, 1951, defendant alienated the affection of plaintiff's wife
and likewise to discredit plaintiff's testimony while on the
stand that he and his wife were very happy and up to the
·time that she was operated on no one enjoyed a happier married life.
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It is our position that any admission or statement made by
plaintiff's \vife evidencing her lack of affection for her husband
or detailing the unfavorable conditions under which plaintiff
and his wife lived \vere facts which the jury might consider
to determine if plaintiff himself had reasons to disbelieve
'"hat he testified to. The jury was entitled to know from the
testimony and admission of plaintiff's wife whether or not
the conditions v.'ere as claimed by plaintiff or if his treatment
of her did not alienate her affection and minimize the damages
to which plaintiff was entitled.
The following questions were asked the plaintiff:
Q. Is it not a fact? Did you hear your wife testify in
the divorce action ?
A. I did.
Q. Did you hear your wife say that she had had trouble
from time to time snice the first year of your marriage (Tr. 159).
Objection was made to the questions and the court excused the jury while the matter was considered.
The court took the position that the testimony given by
plaintiff's wife in taking he~ deposition in August, 1951 and
at the trial -of the divorce case in October, 1951 was hearsay
(Tr. 160). The further objection was made that the testimony
of plaintiff's wife should not be offered because it was in attempt to get before the jury evidence which we would not be
permitted to offer if she were on the stand (Tr. 161).
Defendant's position with respect to such testimony was
that it was a declaration made by plaintiff's wife and within
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plaintiff's hearing and that it was proper for the purpose of
showing the state of plaintiff's wife's feelings and the condition under which she lived. Defendant further contends that
as impeachmen~ of plaintiff it was proper. Plaintiff had built
his. entire case on the proposition that he and his wife lived
happily together; that they enjoyed perfect companionship;
that they spent four or five nights a week· with mutual friends;
and that he thought she was extremely happy with him. The
testimony of his wife was therefore competent when offered
in his· presence for the purpose of impeaching his ·recital as
to how he and his wife lived.
Defendant was not permitted to show that plaintiff had
heard from the lips of his wife testimony which would impeach the ·testimony he had given. Upon that theory de~enda.nt
contended that the testimony was proper for the purpose of
discrediting his ba~d declaration as to his wife's happiness.
The court stated: ((The court believes that the evidence attempted to be brought in by this line of testimony, inquiring as to
whether the plaintiff knows his wife testified to such and such
a thing at a hearing in August, 1951 would be clearly objectionable as hearsay. . . . I think that it is an insurmountable
objection, I can't see any exceptions that would allow you
to bring in t~at hearsay testimony, and those statements made
by the wife, whether under oath or not, that is still hearsay.
You have to call the witness, so that the witness may be crossexamined. I think the hearsay rule would forbid you to go into
this whole line of testimony as to what his wife testified on
that date." (Tr. 162).
We do not believe that the objection of hearsay can
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be directed against the testimony offered to discredit plaintiff's
testimony.
The testimony was not offered for the purpose· of establishing the facts testified to but for the purpose of showing that
plaintiff had heard from his wife's own lips statements discrediting his claims that she was happy. Suppose plaintiff had
testified that he never said an unkind word to his' wife; that
he and his wife never talked about getting a divorce; that
his wife was never unhappy. Would defendant not be en
titled to show that plaintiff's wife stated to a friend that she
was unhappy, that she and plaintiff did nothing but quarrel
and fight; that she had left him three times with the intention
of getting a divorce?
Plaintiff's testimony ·is a declaration of his conclusion of
how his wife felt. Is not her statement to a friend that she
felt differently than plaintiff testified to permissible for the
purpose of impeaching plaintiff's testimony? It is our position
that plaintiff could not consistently contend that his wife's
feelings and her satisfaction t~:bout the home were as he stated,
when prior to the time of making those statements he .had
.heard ~er describe the conditions as being different from what
he had stated. The jury might still have believed the testimony
of plaintiff but the jury was entitled to know that when plaintiff made the statements he had heard the testimony from his
wife-statments made by her that did not square with his
testimony.
We, therefore, believe that the court committed error in
refusing to permit us to ask the plaintiff if he heard his wife
make the statements contained in her testimony at the taking ·
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of the deposition and at the trial of the divorce case which
statements are set out in the transcript pp. 167-183· inclusive.
We shall call the court's attention to only a small portion
of the testimony set out in the transcript and which we asked
the court may offer of proof to .Permit us to sh0w that plaintiff heard her give.
Plaintiff's wife testified:
I had no facilities. I was ·carrying water to fill
my washer. I was using an old washer. I was carrying
in coal. I was cutting my own kindling, and trying
to keep it all up ... (Tr. 168).
·
The house was run down. The door knob on
the back door was off for months and months and
months for want of a little screw. Every time he'd open
the door, the door knob would come out. The grass
would grow, and unless I would go out and cut it, it
wasn't cut . . . but if Dale got out to cut· the lawn,
he'd usually stop and talk with anyone that came along.
It was usually too late then ... "(Tr. 174-5).
t t

•

•

•

tt

•••

I hated to have my friends come to see where
I lived. It embarrassed me when my people came. It
embarrassed my people to come and see where I was
living. I have a lot of girl friends over in Payson. I'd
say (come and see me,' and then I'd hope like the
dickens that they'd never come." (Tr. 176).
u

•••

(( . . . Everytime I left, even to go to Salt Lake,
I-I dreaded going back to Payson. . . When I went
to California I thought ]f I could only stay.' My
father kept encouraging me to come back. He said,
(Geraldine, you have got two children. You have got
to consider your· children first. Go back and hide your
feelings, and don't tell anyone.' So I'd go back, and
I'd put on ·a front. By that time I'd lost every bit of
love I ever had for Dale." (Tr. 176-7).
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t(A. I came back and kept telling myself that perhaps
if I kept telling him that I love him, maybe I myself
'\\·ill start believing it, but l couldn't. It was an effort
for me to even put my arms around him. I got to the
place \vhere I'd-·I even lost my respect for him .· . ."
(Tr. 177-8).
He used to make fun, say (Mama is stupid.
She can't do this, she can't do that.' He was always
belittling me, and telling me that I couldn't do things."
(Tr. 179).
tt

•

•

•

He didn't seem to appreciate anything I ever
did. He never made any comments about what had
been done ... " (Tr.· 179).
tt

•••

HI couldn't say Dale was a drinking man. No, but
he liked to drink with the boys. The boys would come
and he'd have one, and always when he'd get one,
he was belligerent. That was when he was belittling
me and calling me down." (Tr. 182).
Plaintiff's wife testified on August 4, 1951, as follows:
A. The second time is when my grandmother broke her
hip and I went down to take care of her. I told my
father at that time that I was very unhappy and that
I didn't want to go back.

Q. When was that, do you recall?
A. I believe approximately it. was 1947, I wouldn't be
sure of the year.
Q. But you didn't tell Dale anything about it?
A. Dale knew I was unhappy, we had discussed the
matter from time to time. (Tr. 183).
We submit that the defendant was entitled to ask the
plaintiff if he heard his wife make the statements shown by
the evidence offered.
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We did not ask plaintiff if the statements made by his wife
were true-but if he 'heard her testify as shown.
If he didn't hear her testify it would have been hearsay
as to plaintiff. But statements of plaintiff's wife were not hearsay. if made in his presence and heard by him.
In view that plaintiff was advising the jury how happy
his wife wasJ any statement made by his wife inconsistent with
his testimony is proper to impeach his testimony.
In re ·Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193 72 Pac. 962,
our Supreme Court at p. 202 (26 U) quoted approvingly the
. following language:
((Fron1 these decisions it is fairly deducible that a
widow or divorced wife is competent to testify to any
facts or acts occurring during the married life which
did not come to her knowledge in confidence growing
out of the marital relation, although they may tend to
show the husband had committed a fraud, or to discredit
him as a witness} or indirectly to show th~t he had been
guilty of a crime."

CONCLUSION
The evidence in this care ·warrants no judgment at all
in favor of the plaintiff. The excessive verdict returned by
the jury is based upon passion and prejudice, engendered by
the attitude of the Court, the ruling of the Court on evidence
and the instructions of the Court to the jury. A reduced verdict in this case would not meet the ends of justice. A com80
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plete reversal is fully justified on the basis heretofore set forth
in this brief.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE W. WORTHEN
ARNOLD ROYLANCE
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

81
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

